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Economic theory, as well as commonly-stated views of practitioners, suggests that macroeconomic 
conditions can affect both the ability and manner in which firms raise external financing.  Theory 
suggests that downturns should be associated with a shift toward less information-sensitive securities, as 
well as a ‘flight to quality,’ in which firms can issue high-rated securities but not low-rated ones.  We 
evaluate these hypotheses on a large sample of publicly-traded debt issues, seasoned equity offers, and 
bank loans. We find that worse macroeconomic conditions lead firms to use less information-sensitive 
securities. In addition, poor market conditions affect the structure of securities offered, shifting them 
towards shorter maturities and more security. Furthermore, market conditions affect the quality of 
securities offered, with worsening conditions substantially lowering the number of low-rated debt issues.  
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As illustrated so dramatically by the Financial Crisis of 2008, macroeconomic conditions can 
dramatically affect firms’ access to capital and the manner in which they can raise it.  Practitioners view 
the possibility that macroeconomic conditions will adversely affect a firm’s access to capital markets as 
an important factor in their firms’ financial policies.  For example, Richard Passov, the longtime treasurer 
of Pfizer, argues that the possibility of being shut out of the capital markets during market downturns is 
the primary reason why Pfizer and other technology companies often place such importance on a high 
bond rating [See Passov 2003]. According to Graham and Harvey (2001)’s well-known survey, an 
important goal of Chief Financial Officers is to maintain financial flexibility “so that they do not need to 
shrink their business in case of an economic downturn (p.218).” The extent to which this concern is 
justified and macroeconomic factors can affect a firm’s access to capital is an important issue in finance 
and has clear policy implications. 
There has, however, been important work done on the role of monetary policy on firms’ access to 
capital.  Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Kashyap and Stein (2000) present empirical work suggesting 
that monetary policy’s impact is mainly on small firms.  Yet, as the Pfizer example and the financial crisis 
illustrate, macroeconomic conditions work more broadly than solely through the monetary policy channel, 
and affect large and highly-rated firms in important ways.    
In this paper, we develop a set of stylized facts about the way in which macroeconomic 
conditions affect both firms’ access to external capital and the manner in which they raise it.  We then test 
the implications of theories about the equilibrium issuances of different kinds of securities in market 
downturns.  To perform this analysis, we assemble a database containing information on alternative ways 
in which firms can raise capital. Our sample contains detailed information on 21,657 publicly-traded debt 






sample (from 1988 to 2007) also includes data on 40,097 completed and mostly syndicated loan 
tranches.
1 
   We first provide statistics documenting the average quantity of capital raised though issuance of 
different kinds of securities during different market conditions. A complicating factor when interpreting 
these numbers is the enormous increase in the total value of funds raised during our sample period.  
Nonetheless, there are some noticeable differences in the average proceeds raised per month during weak 
and strong economic conditions. For example, average proceeds raised through SEOs tend to drop during 
poor market conditions.  However, short-term and highly-rated public debt increases noticeably relative to 
longer-term and lower-rated issues during poor market conditions.  
Theory makes a number of predictions about the relation between macroeconomic conditions and 
the structure and availability of security issues.  In particular, poor macroeconomic conditions will lead 
firms to issue less information-sensitive securities, shifting from equity to convertibles, and from 
convertibles to debt.  Poor economic conditions should also increase the demand for monitoring of firms, 
causing them to shift from public to private securities.  In addition to affecting the type of securities 
offered, macroeconomic conditions also can affect the structure of securities; in particular, poor financial 
conditions potentially lead firms to shorten the maturity and to add security to the securities they issue.  
Finally during poor financial times, issuing low-quality debt is particularly difficult, so that observed debt 
issuances will be primarily high quality debt.     
We examine these hypotheses empirically using the database we assembled.  Our econometric 
analysis suggests that macroeconomic conditions affect both firms’ abilities to raise capital and the 
manner in which they raise it. We find that the conditional probability of issuing less information 
sensitive securities, i.e., convertibles rather than equity, increases when the economy contracts. We do not 
observe an increase in the demand for bank loans during economic downturns. However, we document 
that the borrowers of our sample of private loans tend to be of higher quality during bad economic times, 
                                                 
1 The primary sources of capital omitted from this sample are regular bank loans, commercial paper, and private 






consistent with the view that capital available to intermediaries goes down, leading them to tighten 
lending standards during these periods. In addition to the choice of securities, we also find that market-
wide factors affect the structure of debt contracts. In particular, market downturns decrease the expected 
maturity of public bonds and private loans and increase the likelihood that these bonds and loans are 
secured. These findings are consistent with the view that poor macroeconomic conditions lead firms to 
structure securities in ways that lessen their information sensitivity. 
Finally, we consider the quality of the public securities, measured by their ratings.  For our 
sample of public bonds, our results suggest that market downturns do not reduce the issuances of high 
quality bonds, but are associated with a substantial drop in the likelihood of a junk or unrated bond issue.  
This pattern suggests that lower quality firms tend to be shut out of the credit markets during poor market 
conditions. 
  This paper extends the literature on security choice in a number of ways.  Important early 
contributions to this literature are Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) and Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (1999), 
whose concern is how firm-level factors influence the choice of securities.
2  In contrast, our focus is how 
these choices are affected by the business cycle, in the tradition of Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) and 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003).  To our knowledge, our paper is the first to evaluate the implications of 
theories about the choice over the business cycle, considering a menu of securities broader than between 
equity and public debt, including convertibles and private debt, as well as alternative characteristics of 
public and private debt such as maturity and security.  In addition, our findings on the quality of private 
and public debt issues offered over the business cycle is consistent with commonly-stated practitioners’ 
views but not as of yet documented in the academic literature. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:  Section I summarizes theoretical work 
providing explanations on why economy-wide factors could affect the manner in which firms raise capital.  
Section II describes the data employed in this paper and reports summary statistics.  Section III presents 
univariate comparisons of firms issuing securities in different market conditions.  It also provides 
                                                 






statistics on the characteristics of the firms issuing different kinds of securities.  Section IV uses 
multivariate analysis to estimate the way in which economy-wide factors can affect security choice, 
focusing on the broad question of what kind of security to issue; equity, public debt, or private debt. 
Section V examines the impact of macroeconomic conditions on the design of debt contracts.  Section VI 
looks more closely at the firms issuing public debt, and considers how public debt issues of different 
quality vary over the business cycle.  Section VII provides a brief summary and conclusion. 
I.  Why economy-wide factors could conceivably affect corporate capital-raising. 
A.  Theoretical Background. 
  There have been a number of attempts to link theoretically the state of the overall economy with 
firms’ ability to borrow.  Of course, in a Modigliani-Miller world with perfect information, no 
transactions costs, and managers whose interests are perfectly aligned with shareholders’, economy-wide 
factors should have no effect on firms’ financial decisions.  Therefore, attempts to model the linkage 
between macroeconomic factors and firms’ financial decisions necessarily rely on a market imperfection 
of one kind or another. 
  Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) present a model in which managers can divert some of the firm’s 
resources for their own private benefits, reducing the net worth of the firm and therefore make the firm 
less attractive to lenders. In the Holmstrom and Tirole model, firms can either borrow directly from 
lenders, or indirectly through an intermediary that provides monitoring. In this model, monitoring reduces 
the private benefits the manager can extract from the firm and hence alleviates the moral hazard problem. 
Monitoring is costly since it requires monitors to put up their own capital to avoid moral hazard on their 
part.  Firms prefer to borrow directly rather than through an intermediary, since borrowing directly avoids 
paying the monitor for his services. In equilibrium, only the firms with sufficiently high net worth can 
borrow directly.  Lesser quality firms can borrow directly only if (or after) they borrow from a monitoring 
intermediary. The worst quality firms cannot borrow at all.  
  The effect of a market downturn is twofold in the context of this model.  First, a downturn lowers 






directly into the region where they have to rely on intermediaries, and pushes some of the intermediary-
using firms out of the capital market altogether.  Second, the capital available to intermediaries goes down, 
creating a credit crunch that reduces the number of firms to which they can lend.  Since intermediaries 
prefer to lend to better firms, firms with the lowest net worth end up being shut out of the capital market. 
This analysis implies that during market downturns, we should observe lower quality firms being shut out 
of the public debt market (the direct borrowing channel), some of whom can alternatively borrow from 
monitoring intermediaries and some of whom cannot borrow at all.   
  An alternative approach is to consider market imperfections coming from information 
asymmetries between firms and investors.  Bernanke and Gertler (1989) take this approach, assuming that 
the degree of asymmetric information is a decreasing function of the firm’s net worth.  As the economy 
slows down, firms’ net worth declines, increasing the information asymmetry problem.  In market 
downturns, firms, especially ones that have a lower net worth to begin with, are unable to receive 
financing.  These financial frictions serve to magnify the underlying economic problems and worsen 
business cycles.   
The first-order prediction of this model for financing behavior is, similar to Holmstrom and 
Tirole, that poorer quality firms are shut out of the financial markets during overall market downturns.  In 
addition, this analysis has an additional implication not emphasized by Bernanke and Gertler (1989):  
Firms will have an incentive to shift the securities they use toward less information-sensitive ones during 
market downturns.  To illustrate, suppose that a firm is indifferent between issuing equity or a convertible 
bond during a boom.  If market conditions deteriorate and information asymmetry problems worsen, then 
at the margin, the same firm will be pushed towards the convertible bond issue, since it is less 
information-sensitive than equity.  Similarly, firms will have incentives to shorten maturities of the bonds 
they issue, and to issue bonds that offer more security to the lender.
3   
                                                 
3 Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) make similar arguments and present a model in which the increased investment 
opportunities in expansions lower asymmetric information and lead to more equity offerings.  Levy and Hennessy 






Similar to Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Diamond (1991a) presents a moral hazard model 
focusing on the borrower’s choice between direct financing (public debt) without monitoring and a bank 
loan with monitoring. The Diamond model explicitly examines this choice as a function of a borrower’s 
reputation (track record), which is built over time through repeated borrowing and monitoring.   
Monitoring, which lowers moral hazard by the borrower, is costly and delegated to a financial 
intermediary. As in the papers discussed above, the key determinant of debt structure is credit quality.  
However, in Diamond (1991a), credit quality is determined over time through a rating, which is a 
function of a firm’s reputation.  Firms with sufficiently high credit quality borrow directly through public 
debt market since they do not need to incur monitoring costs. Also firms with low ratings do not benefit 
from bank monitoring since they do not have incentives to build a reputation.  
The Diamond model predicts that the firms that borrow from a financial intermediary are the ones 
with credit ratings toward the middle of the spectrum. An important implication of the model is that 
during economic downturns, only some borrowers with the highest ratings can continue borrowing 
directly and the rest will need monitoring. In other words, during the down cycles, average bank 
borrowers will be higher-rated and the ratio of bank loans to lower-rated public debt will increase. 
Bolton and Freixas (2000) also study the choice between different types of financing for the firm 
in a setting in which the underlying frictions are based on asymmetric information. This paper considers 
equity issues in addition to private and public debt as potential financing sources for the firm.
4 Similar to 
Myers and Majluf (1984), equity issuance is associated with information dilution costs. Furthermore, for 
some borrowers, public debt can also be costly because it can lead to inefficient liquidation. While bank 
loans are more flexible, borrowing from banks is relatively expensive because of monitoring costs. In 
equilibrium, variation in the credit quality of the borrowing firms determines the choice between these 
financing options. In this model, the riskiest firms cannot borrow, while the safest firms can borrow 
                                                                                                                                                             
Underlying the model is a moral hazard problem solved by managerial ownership, the optimal level of which varies 
with business conditions. 
4 In addition to the papers discussed here, the literature on the firm’s choice between bank and public debt include 
Besanko and Kanatas (1993), Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1993), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), Boot and 






directly through capital markets, either by issuing public debt or equity. The borrowers with moderate risk 
borrow from the banks because of the flexibility provided during financial distress.  
These models’ predictions concern the equilibrium effect of macroeconomic conditions on capital 
raising.  Nonetheless, most of the analysis in these models focuses on the supply side.  However, it is 
likely that macroeconomic conditions could affect the demand for capital as well.  Unfortunately, it is not 
clear theoretically the direction in which demand for capital will change over the business cycle.  It is 
possible that demand for capital could be pro-cyclical since the value of firms’ investment opportunities is 
likely to increase during booming economies, as in the Shleifer (1986) model.  However, during poor 
economic times, firms are also likely to use up their cash reserves and have to raise capital to finance 
operations, as occurred in the auto industry during 2008.  The net effect of market-wide conditions on the 
demand for capital is unclear.  Nonetheless, the observed effect of macroeconomic conditions on security 
choice is the equilibrium of both supply and demand effects, and the empirical results presented below 
should be interpreted as such. 
Despite the differences in the underlying assumptions, these models all suggest that firms’ ability 
to raise capital as well as their choice of security conditional on issuance will be affected by overall 
market conditions. During market downturns, poor quality firms will tend to be credit-rationed, so that the 
firms observed issuing securities should be of relatively higher quality than those firms issuing during 
expansions.  In addition, all other things equal, firms will be more likely to use less information-sensitive 
securities during recessions than during expansions.  In particular, during recessions, firms will be less 
likely to issue equity and more likely to issue debt, and conditional on a debt issue, firms will tend to 
structure it with less information-sensitive characteristics (i.e., shorter-term or secured).  Finally, during 
market downturns, firms will substitute away from publicly traded debt to private debt that is associated 
with greater monitoring.  
B.  Related Empirical Work 
  There have been a number of papers documenting the manner in which equity offerings vary over 






during boom periods than during market downturns.  This pattern appears to persist over a number of 
different time periods.  [See Hickman (1953), Moore (1980), Choe et al. (1993), Dittmar and Dittmar 
(2007) and Dittmar and Thakor (2007].
5 
  Gomes and Phillips (2007) provide a fairly comprehensive analysis of the security choice 
decision, focusing on the way in which asymmetric information affects the choice among public and 
private equity and debt securities.  These authors do not focus on the role of macroeconomic factors.  
However, to the extent that a number of models discussed above argue that market-wide factors affect 
security choice through their effect on asymmetric information, Gomes and Phillips’ results are related to 
ours. 
  Perhaps the most related paper to ours is Korajczyk and Levy (2003).  Korazczyk and Levy 
examine the way in which firms’ capital structures vary over the business cycle, and they focus their 
analysis on the differences between constrained and unconstrained firms.  Their main finding is that 
leverage ratios tend to be countercyclical for unconstrained firms and cyclical for constrained firms. 
Korazczyk and Levy’s focus is nonetheless quite different from ours; while they concentrate on the debt-
equity ratio, our goal is to study how the business cycle affects the manner in which firms raise capital 
and the way they structure the securities they issue.  
 
II.  Data Sources and Sample Description 
A.  Data Sources 
We obtain data on security issues from three different sources:  SDC Global New Issues Database 
for SEOs, Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) for convertible bonds and other public debt, 
and Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan for private loans. The SDC database provides information on 
total proceeds and the number of primary and secondary shares offered for each SEO. In our sample of 
                                                 
5 There have also been several papers documenting the cross-sectional properties of debt maturity.  [See Barclay and 
Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), and Scherr and Hulburt (2001)].  In addition, Rauh and Sufi (2009) provide 







SEOs, we exclude all private placements.  In addition, we drop SEOs that only offer secondary shares 
since these offerings do not lead to a capital inflow to the firm. This process leads to a sample of 7,746 
SEOs by 4,885 U.S. firms that have Compustat identifiers from 1971 to 2007.  
Mergent FISD provides comprehensive information for US corporate debt, including total 
proceeds raised as well as other characteristics such as maturity, security, convertibility, and credit quality. 
We utilize all public debt issues made by industrial firms reported in FISD from 1971 to 2007.  Our initial 
public bond sample consists of 21,657 issues from 3,072 firms with Compustat identifiers.  The average 
initial maturity is 12 years and the median is 10 years.  Most of the bonds are unsecured (96.3%) while 
slightly more than half (55%) have investment-grade ratings. 
Our data on private debt are from Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan, which contains detailed 
issuance-level information on the characteristics of syndicated and sole-lender bank loans. These 
characteristics include size and maturity of the loan, credit quality of the borrower, as well as information 
on whether the loan is secured by some type of collateral or not.  Each loan can have multiple tranches, 
each of which contains different characteristics. Our sample comprises 40,097 completed loan tranches to 
7,465 firms with Compustat identifiers between 1988 and 2007, including 364-day facilities (9.58%), 
bridge loans (1.6%), term loans (29.84%), and revolving loans and credit lines (58.98%).
6 The mean loan 
maturity is about 3.7 years with a slightly shorter median of 3.4 years.  Contrary to the sample of public 
bonds, most of the loans are secured, with 79% of sample loans being secured by some type of collateral. 
Using these issue-level data, we collapse each firm’s issues at the month level. We focus on 
monthly issue-level data because our macroeconomic data is available monthly and we explore the 
manner in which macroeconomic conditions affect firms’ capital raising decisions.
7 We then match the 
firm-month observations with accounting information from Compustat and eliminate all financial firms 
                                                 
6 We thank Amir Sufi and Michael Roberts for sharing Compustat identifiers that allow us to match Dealscan Loan 
data with accounting data from Compustat. See Chava and Roberts (2008) for a discussion of the process of 
gathering these identifiers. 
7 We have estimated all equations in the paper using quarterly data as well.  Quarterly data is less fine and does not 
match perfectly with the macroeconomic data, but has the advantage of corresponding exactly with quarterly 
accounting data.  The results using quarterly data are in all cases similar to those reported below and are available 






(one-digit SIC equal to 6) and utilities (two-digit SIC equal to 49). After this process, we end up with a 
sample containing 7,170 firm-months with SEO issues, 2,546 firm-months with convertible bond issues, 
and 10,400 firm months with straight public bond issues from 1971 to 2007, and also 20,322 firm-months 
with private loan contracts from 1988 to 2007. 
For macroeconomic data, we obtain recession/expansion dates from the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) and GDP growth rates are from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA).  In addition to macroeconomic data, we consider a direct survey-based measure of the state of 
financial conditions provided by the Federal Reserve, called the ‘Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on 
Bank Lending Practices.’ This survey is a quarterly survey of approximately sixty large domestic banks 
and twenty-four U.S. branches of foreign banks, asking the managers of these banks how their bank is 
changing their credit standards.  The particular variable we focus on is the net percentage of domestic 
respondents who claim that they are tightening standards for commercial and industrial loans.
8 One 
limitation of this survey is that it is available only after the second quarter of 1990, so when we use the 
survey data, we restrict our sample to this sub-period. 
B. The Pattern of Security Issues over Different Market Conditions 
Table I presents descriptive statistics of our security issuance sample.  To provide a rough idea of 
the time-series variation in the use of securities, we divide the sample into sub-periods based on the 
NBER’s expansion/recession classification.  For each sub-period, we report the proceeds raised in 
constant 2000 $US million for four types of securities in that period:  SEOs, convertibles, straight public 
bonds, and private loans.  Since recessions are substantially shorter than expansions during our sample 
period, we report the monthly average proceeds rather than total proceeds during each sub-period.    
A complicating factor in our analysis is that the quantity of capital raised increased substantially 
over the sample period as the economy expanded even after controlling for the inflation, due in part to the 
development of the syndicated loan market.  Given the rapid growth in the quantity of issuances, it is 
                                                 
8 See Lown, Morgan, and Rohatgi (2000) for more information about the survey. These authors document that the 
survey results are strongly related to loan growth, with tightening standards being associated with slower loan 






difficult to infer patterns about the relative effects of market conditions.  Nonetheless, a few patterns 
relating macroeconomic conditions and security offerings are evident from Table I.  In particular, equity 
offerings decline during recessions, but public debt offerings appear to rise.  The rise of the syndicated 
loan market is also evident, coming into existence in the late 1980s and becoming the predominant form 
of capital raising by the 2000s.   
We observe a similar pattern in Figure 1, which reports the time-series trend of the natural 
logarithm of the proceeds raised (in constant 2000 $US million) for each calendar month during our 
sample period.  Shaded areas in the figure denote recessions as defined by the NBER.  Figure 1 highlights 
the manner in which SEOs tend to decrease during recessions while public bonds and CBs tend to 
increase.  
Table II normalizes the amount of capital raised through each method in each calendar month by 
the total capital raised in that particular month and considers how the percentage of capital raised by 
different methods varies over different market conditions. To consider the effect of market downturns on 
security issuances, we rely on three alternative measures of market-wide conditions.  In addition to an 
NBER-defined recession, we characterize months by GDP growth, and label a month ‘Low Growth’ if 
GDP growth in that particular quarter is below the 25
th percentile of economic growth over the entire 
sample period.  Finally we define ‘Weak Credit Supply’ months as those for which the net percentage of 
senior loan officers tightening standards for loans to large and medium firms is positive for that particular 
quarter.   
Panel A of Table II presents the relative proceeds raised by different forms of financing for the 
1971-1987 sub-period, for which there are no syndicated loans, while Panel B reports the results 
subsequent to 1988, the first year for which we have data for syndicated loans.  For both sub-periods, the 
fraction of capital raised by public debt is larger during market downturns than in expansions.  In contrast, 
equity issues appear to be pro-cyclical, with larger fractions being raised during expansions than 
contractions.  This pattern is consistent with the idea that less information-sensitive securities such as debt 






on convertibles; in the earlier sub-period convertibles account for a larger fraction of capital raised during 
expansions while in the latter sub-period they account for a larger fraction during recessions.  Contrary to 
the theories presented above, private debt appears to account for a higher fraction of capital raised during 
expansions than recessions.   
These numbers suggest that there are differences in methods of capital raising across different 
market conditions. Consistent with theory, Table II suggests that SEOs, the most information-sensitive 
security we consider, decline noticeably during market downturns.  The issuance of public debt is 
insensitive to market conditions and is even larger during downturns, consistent with the models of 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989).  In addition to the type of securities 
offered, these theories have predictions about the quality and structure of the securities offered during 
market downturns.  These models predict that there will be a ‘flight to quality’, in which higher quality 
debt is relatively insulated from market downturns while lower quality debt issuances decline in quantity. 
In terms of the structure of securities, the Bernanke and Gertler model predicts that firms will prefer less 
information-sensitive securities during market downturns, leading them to shorten the maturities of their 
bonds and loans, and to be more likely to issue secured rather than unsecured bonds and loans. 
To evaluate these predictions, Table III breaks down the public debt issues more finely, 
documenting the extent to which the use of bonds of different maturity, security, and quality vary by 
market conditions.  In the first two columns we report the relative proportion of short-term public debt, as 
well as secured public debt.
9  We define a bond to be short-term if the time to maturity of the issue is less 
than five years.
10  Our measure of security level is a dummy variable set to one if the bond is secured and 
set to zero otherwise.  If the firm issues more than one bond in a particular month, we label the 
observation as secured if the proceeds raised from the secured bond is at least half of the total proceeds 
raised.  Consistent with the predictions of the theories, the relative proceeds raised through short-term 
                                                 
9 Mergent does not contain any short-term debt issues prior to 1985.  Hence, we consider short-term debt to be 
missing before 1985 when computing the numbers presented in Table III. 
10 If the firm issued more than one bond, then the issue activity is classified as short-term if the proceeds-weighted 






debt, which is less information sensitive, increase significantly during recessions and weak credit supply. 
However, the results for secured debt are more ambiguous, with the proportion of debt that is secured 
being somewhat higher in good economic times than in downturns.  
The remaining columns of Table III present the fraction of capital raised by public debt with 
different credit quality across varying macroeconomic conditions.  The pattern is clear:  Lower quality 
and unrated debt issues decline substantially during poor market conditions.  During recessions, the 
quantity of low-quality issues declines to one third to one half of the expansion levels, depending on the 
sample period used. In contrast, the level of investable B-rated issues is about the same, leading the 
fraction of A-rated issues to increase by about twenty percentage points during recessions.  The pattern is 
similar if we measure market conditions using GDP growth or the survey of credit supply, although the 
differences are somewhat smaller. 
Figure 2 illustrates this pattern graphically.  The vertical axis measures the natural logarithm of 
proceeds raised (in constant 2000 $US million) bu public bonds of various quality and the numbers 
reported are 11-month moving averages around each calendar month.  The figure suggests an overall 
upward trend in the use of public debt financing in all levels of credit quality.  However, it also points out 
the differential impact of a recession on the public debt with different ratings.  During recessions, the 
quantity of capital raised by low-rated and non-rated debt issues drops significantly while highly-rated 
bonds remain relatively constant or even rise. 
 
III. Firm Characteristics 
In addition to market-level characteristics, firm-level characteristics affect both the likelihood of 
raising capital, and conditional on raising capital, the method used to raise the capital.  To illustrate these 
differences, the first two columns of Table IV compare characteristics of firms in months in which some 
type of security was offered to months in which no security was issued.  These characteristics are firm 
size (natural logarithm of total assets), leverage, market to book, cash flow, cash, the inverse of interest 






the natural logarithm of (1+interest/EBIT) and stock return is calculated over the previous twelve 
months.
11 As in Table II, we report the results separately for 1971-1987 sub-period (in panel A) and post-
1988 sub-period (in panel B) during which we have the data for private loans.  The accounting variables 
reported are taken from the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the issue.   
Relative to firm-months with no issues, firms in issuing months tend to be larger, older, and have 
higher growth and better prior stock performance.  For the issuing months, the average sales growth for 
the year just prior to the security issuance is 0.31 in panel A and 0.27 in panel B, compared to 0.19 in 
panel A and 0.18 in panel B for nonissuing months. The stock return over the previous twelve months is 
0.62 and 0.34 for issuing months, compared to 0.19 and 0.17 for nonissuing months in panels A and B 
respectively. In addition, issues are less likely during market downturns, regardless of which measure of 
financial conditions one uses in both panels A and B. 
  The remaining columns of Table IV summarize differences in firm characteristics across issuers 
of alternative securities. SEO issuers tend to be the smallest, youngest, and they have the highest market 
to book ratios in both panels.  Public debt issuers are substantially larger, and they have higher fixed asset 
ratios than issuers of other types of securities. In contrast, issuers of private loans are noticeably smaller 
than public debt issuers, with lower cash flows and fixed assets.  This pattern suggests that public debt 
issuers are noticeably different from other kinds of issuers, consistent with the view that publicly-traded 
debt is the most attractive form of financing, and that firms using other forms are unable to issue publicly-
traded debt.  
 
IV.  Multivariate Analysis of Security Choice  
The aggregate statistics and the univariate comparisons are both suggestive of the hypothesis that 
firm characteristics and macroeconomic conditions affect the way firms raise capital. However, to 
identify the effect of macroeconomic conditions on the issuance of the firms’ funding choices, it is 
important to estimate this effect in a multivariate setting, controlling for firm-level factors and time 
                                                 






trends. An important consideration is that the effect of changing macroeconomic conditions on the 
demand for capital is theoretically ambiguous. Worsening market conditions could either increase 
demand for capital, because of a decline in cash flows, or decrease the demand for capital, because of 
fewer investment opportunities.  Since demand for capital will clearly be an important consideration in 
the decision to issue securities, it is important to control econometrically for factors likely to be related to 
demand for capital. 
  To evaluate formally the extent to which financing choices are affected by macroeconomic as 
well as firm-specific factors, we employ discrete-choice models that estimate the likelihood of a firm 
issuing a specified type of security in a particular time period.  At any point in time, a firm can choose not 
to obtain financing, to obtain a private loan, or to access the public security markets by issuing a straight 
bond, convertible bond, or seasoned equity.  Given the number of potential alternative outcomes, we 
utilize econometric approaches that allow for multiple discrete choices. 
A.  An Ordered Logit Approach 
  Theoretically, we expect that during poor financial conditions, firms will, at the margin, be more 
likely to issue less information-sensitive securities than during good financial conditions.  This hypothesis 
suggests a natural ordering of the possible issuances arising from their information sensitivity.  In 
particular, internally generated funds are least sensitive to information, followed by private debt, public 
debt, convertible debt, and finally, seasoned equity.  We assign a ‘4’ to equity, a ‘3’ to convertibles, and a 
‘2’ to public bonds.  Since for monitoring reasons, private debt is likely to be more attractive during poor 
times, we assign private debt a ‘1’, and if a firm does not issue a security, a ‘0’.  Our prediction is that this 
ordering will be positively related with market-wide conditions, so that a recession, a period of low 
growth, or tight credit markets should be negatively related to this variable. 
We estimate a model predicting which of these securities will be issued as a function of firm-
specific factors as well as market-wide factors.  Since the dependent variable is ordered, we utilize an 
‘ordered logit’ specification that takes advantage of the ordering of the dependent variable to improve the 
efficiency of the estimator.






Pr(security type  =  j) = Pr(μ j−1 < ′  β X +ε < μ j)                                                (1) 
where j equals 0 if the firm is not issuing any type of security, 1 for a bank loan, 2 for a public 
bond, 3 for a convertible debt, and 4 for an SEO.  β is a vector of coefficients, X is a vector of explanatory 
variables outlined in Table V (described in detail in Appendix 1), ε follows a logistic distribution, and μj 
represents unknown cutoff parameters to be estimated. 
Table V contains estimates of this ordered logit model.  Each of the three columns uses a different 
measure of market-wide conditions:  Column (1) uses the NBER-defined recession, Column (2) uses the 
level of GDP growth, and Column (3) uses the Senior Loan Officer Opinion survey on lending standards.  
Each equation also includes a number of variables designed to capture the firm’s financial condition and 
demand for capital (e.g., market to book, cash flow, and sales growth).  Other firm-level controls are 
firm’s age, natural logarithm of the total assets, leverage, cash, natural logarithm of the inverse of interest 
coverage,
12 and a debt-rating dummy. We also include the firm’s stock return for the prior twelve months, 
which restricts our sample to listed firms. Furthermore, all regressions include industry fixed effects. 
Finally, we include the term spread, defined as the difference between the yields on ten-year treasuries 
and one-year treasuries, as a macro-level control.  The equation is estimated using a panel of monthly 
observations for all firms that had at least one type of security issue at any point during the sample period, 
a procedure that leads to 737,433 observations.
13 We calculate the standard errors in these equations 
allowing for clustering of observations at the firm level.  
In each column of Table V, the coefficient on each measure of market conditions is negative and 
is statistically significantly different from zero in two of the three specifications. The implication of these 
negative coefficients is that when conditions worsen, it is more likely that there is a low value of the 
dependent variable, corresponding to a less information-sensitive security.  For example, if GDP growth 
                                                 
12 The transformation used is a negative function of conventional interest coverage, so that the negative coefficient 
on this variable means that better interest coverage increases the likelihood of a more information sensitive issue.  
We use this transformation because the usual measure of interest coverage becomes infinite for all-equity firms. 
13 We obtain similar results when we include all other firms in Compustat that did not have any security issue during 






is low, it becomes less likely that there is any security issue at all, and if there is an issue, it is likely to be 
a less information-sensitive one.
14 
A potential concern in interpreting the ordered logit results is that it is impossible to tell exactly 
which of the choices is driving the negative coefficient.  For example, estimated coefficient in the ordered 
logit model would be negative if all issuances were less likely during market downturns, or if SEOs 
declined but there was no changes in other issuances.  To evaluate the extent to which each type of 
issuance is affected by market conditions, we estimate the probability of an issue of a particular type, 
conditional on firm-specific and market-wide factors.  
B.  A Multinomial Logit Approach 
Multinomial logit provides one way to estimate systems of this type, in which independent 
variables affect the choice among a finite number of alternative outcomes.  Thus, it provides a natural 
way of modeling a firm’s choice among raising capital through alternative financing methods, or not to 
raise capital at all.















j     type security 
β
β
                                                                              (2) 
where j equals 0 if the firm does not issue any type of security, 1 for a bank loan, 2 for a public 
bond, 3 for a convertible debt, and 4 for an SEO.  βj is a vector of coefficients for outcome j where β0 is 
assumed to be zero, and X is a vector of explanatory variables outlined in Table VI (described in detail in 
Appendix 1). 
                                                 
14 We reestimate all equations throughout the paper excluding refinancing firm-months, which account for 8.7% of 
all issuing firm-months. An issuing month is defined as refinancing if the total value raised in that specific month is 
within plus or minus 15% of the size of the reduction in long-term debt as of the fiscal year end immediately 
following the issue.  The results are similar to the full sample results. 
15 One potential drawback to multinomial logit is the underlying independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption, 
which requires that the choice between any two financing choices be independent of the existence of a third choice.  
For example, the multinomial logit specification implicitly assumes that the choice between public debt and private 
debt is independent of the choice of whether or not to issue seasoned equity.  See Greene (2000) pp. 857-862, and 






  Table VI contains estimates of multinomial logit equations predicting the type of security issued.  
The model allows for five possible outcomes:  The firm can choose not to issue any security, to get a loan, 
to issue a straight bond, to issue a convertible bond, or to do a seasoned equity offering.  In each equation, 
‘no issue’ is the omitted variable, so the coefficients in each column can be interpreted as the impact on 
the probability of issuing a particular type of security relative to not issuing at all.  Each panel utilizes a 
different measure of financial conditions. 
  The coefficient on the variable indicating poor financial conditions is negative and statistically 
significantly different from zero for SEOs, regardless of which measure of macroeconomic conditions we 
use. The estimated effect is fairly large; holding other factors constant, the econometric model implies 
that a recession decreases the likelihood of offering an SEO by 24%.
16 Additionally, the coefficient is 
statistically significantly different from the coefficients on the other securities in the specifications using 
the recession dummy and the weak credit market dummy variable (with respective p-values of 0 and 
0.014) as our measures of financial conditions.  This result indicates that a recession lowers the likelihood 
of issuing an SEO, relative to not issuing any security or issuing any other type of security.  This result is 
consistent with the notion that as financial conditions worsen, firms are less likely to issue equity.  As 
such, it confirms the findings of Hickman (1953), Moore (1980) and Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993), 
who find similar patterns of security issuances over earlier periods (1900-1938, 1946-1970, and 1971-
1991 respectively).   
  The other coefficients in the equations in Table VI are consistent with the view, implicit in the 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) model among others, that the firms issuing public debt are the lowest 
quality risks to a lender.  The coefficients in Table VI indicate that, relative to firms that issue other types 
of securities (or no issue at all), public debt issuers are oldest, largest, have the highest fixed asset ratio 
and sales growth, and are most likely to have a debt rating.   
                                                 
16 The model implies that a recession decreases the likelihood of offering an SEO by 0.11%, which is 24% of 0.46%, 







  Convertible bonds appear to be more likely to occur during poor economic times, holding other 
factors constant.  All three coefficients on the variables indicating poor financial conditions are positive, 
and two of them are statistically significantly different from zero. The coefficients are also fairly large, as 
the incremental effect of a recession, holding other factors constant, is to increase the probability of 
issuing a convertible bond by 8%. Combined with the negative coefficient on SEOs for the financial 
conditions variables, the positive coefficient could reflect firms that otherwise would be issuing equity 
choosing to issue a convertible bond during market downturns.  If asymmetric information increases 
during these downturns, this pattern is consistent with the logic of the Stein (1992) model, in which 
convertible bonds are issued as an alternative to equity when asymmetric information is high.  
 
C. The Credit Quality of Bank Borrowers 
The results from Table VI indicate that the coefficients on the market downturn variables on the 
likelihood of a loan issuance are all negative, and two of the three are statistically significantly different 
from zero. To the extent that syndicated loans are intermediated and are associated with increased 
monitoring relative to public bonds, this pattern does not appear to be consistent with the Diamond 
(1991a) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) models. In these models, poor market conditions induce firms 
to substitute toward intermediated rather than public debt, while these equations indicate that poor 
macroeconomic conditions actually decrease the equilibrium quantity of loans.  
There are several potential explanations for this pattern of results.  First of all, the models 
discussed above predict that some firms will substitute from directly-placed debt toward intermediated 
debt, while other firms that could have received intermediated debt during good times are shut out of the 
capital market altogether.  The impact on overall quantity of loans initiated could be unclear.  Second, 
Dealscan sample reflects large, mostly syndicated loans that are more ‘bond-like’ and not associated with 
monitoring like smaller sole-lender bank loans.  Finally, it could be that this substitution from direct to 






A complicating factor in empirical analysis of loan initiations is that instead of taking out new 
loans, firms have the option of drawing down existing lines of credit.  It seems likely that firms will 
choose to draw down lines of credit more quickly during a recession. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2008) 
document that during the Financial Crisis of 2008, which occurred after our sample period, firms in fact 
did draw down lines of credit substantially faster than they typically do during good economic times.   If 
the recent financial crisis is typical of other recessions in the respect that firms draw down lines of credit 
more than usual, the increase in bank lending during poor market-wide conditions is likely to be larger 
than one would infer by examining only the loans covered by Dealscan, as we do in Table VI. 
Consequently, we consider another implication of the Diamond (1991a) and Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1997) models.  In particular, these models predict that as a credit crunch begins to bind, banks will 
become more selective and lend to higher quality borrowers.  In equilibrium, loans initiated during market 
downturns should be to higher quality firms than those that received them in good economic times. 
We test this prediction using the ratings of borrowers in our sample of loans.  We order the 
ratings of borrowers from 0 to 4, with 0 representing borrowers with bonds that are not rated, 1 
representing C to Caa1 rated, 2 representing B3 to Ba1 rated, 3 representing Baa3 to Baa1 rated, and 4 
representing A3 to Aaa rated. We estimate equations predicting this rating as a function of firm 
characteristics and the three measures of financial conditions. Because of the natural ordering of the 
dependent variable, we estimate the following ordered logit model. 
  Pr(credit  rating  =  j) =Pr(μ j−1 < ′  β X +ε <μ j)                                       (3) 
where j corresponds to borrower credit ratings (0 to 4) as described above, β is a vector of coefficients, X 
is a vector of firm characteristics and financial conditions as outlined in Table VII (and described in detail 
in Appendix 1), ε follows a logistic distribution, and μj’s are unknown cutoff parameters to be estimated 
with the coefficients. 
  Table VII contains estimates of this equation, with each column using a different measure of 






statistically significant.  These positive coefficients strongly suggest that controlling for other factors, 
poor overall market conditions lead banks to provide loans to higher quality borrowers.  This finding is 
consistent with the argument that poor market conditions lower the amount of credit available for banks to 
lend, leading them to drop the worse-quality borrowers and lend only to higher quality ones.
17 
 
V.  Market Conditions and the Design of Debt Contracts 
  We have provided evidence that the distribution of financing choices changes over the business 
cycle.  In particular, firms are less likely to issue types of securities that are relatively more sensitive to 
information during economic downturns.  An additional testable implication of the idea that information-
sensitive securities are relatively less attractive during market downturns is that, conditional on the type of 
security used, firms will alter the structure of those securities depending on macroeconomic conditions.  
Regardless of the type of security used, we expect to observe that as market-wide conditions weaken, 
firms will adjust the design of their securities to minimize their sensitivity to information.
18  
A.  Publicly-traded Bonds 
  We first examine how the characteristics of public bonds vary over the business cycle.  The 
information-sensitivity of a bond increases in the bond’s maturity and decreases when a bond is secured 
with real assets.  Therefore, we expect to observe that, all other things equal, firms are more likely to use 
shorter maturity bonds or secured bonds when market conditions are relatively poor. 
As in Table III, we define short-term firm-months as those with proceeds-weighted initial 
maturity of less than or equal to five years.  Similarly, secured firm-months are defined as those with 
proceeds-weighted secured dummy greater than or equal to 0.5.  We estimate equations predicting 
whether the bond is short term and whether the bond is secured, conditional on an issuance of public debt.   
                                                 
17 When we run multinomial logit models using the same dependent variable and the no-issue as the base outcome, 
the coefficients on our downturn variables are significantly positive for the A-rated borrowers and significantly 
negative for the not-rated ones.  
18 A related implication of this argument is that lenders should impose tighter covenants on borrowers during 
recessions.  Zhang (2008) examines this hypothesis on a sample of large US firms and finds that covenants are 






We restrict the sample to those firm-months for which there is a bond issue, so there are two 
possible outcomes, either short-term or long-term, and either secured or non-secured.  Consequently, we 

























) Pr(                                                         (5) 
where β is a vector of coefficients for short-term debt in equation (4) and secured debt in equation (5), 
and X is a vector of firm characteristics and financial conditions (described in detail in Appendix 1),  
Table VIII contain estimates of these equations.  The first three columns of this table report the 
estimates for equation (4).  The sample period for this estimation is from 1985 to 2007 since there are no 
short-term bond issuances prior to 1985 in our sample. The results suggest that financial conditions and 
the maturity of publicly-traded bonds are negatively related.  The coefficients on the variables 
representing poor conditions are all positive and statistically significant.  This finding is consistent with 
the notion that weak macroeconomic conditions exacerbate asymmetric information problems, since 
shorter maturity securities’ value fluctuates less with changes in information about firm value than does 
longer maturity securities’ value.  
Additionally, consistent with the Diamond (1991b) liquidity risk arguments, we find that short-
term debt issuers tend to be larger, have stronger growth opportunities, and less cash on the balance sheet 
than firms that can issue long-term debt.  The large effect of growth opportunities, as measured by the 
market-to-book ratio, is also consistent with Myers (1977) and Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1980), in 
which firms with better growth opportunities issue on shorter term maturities to help minimize potential 
                                                 
19 We have estimated a number of alternative specifications that we have reported in previous drafts.  In particular, 
we have estimated two-stage models in which we first estimate the likelihood of a bond issue, and then estimate, 
conditional on the issue, the factors that affect the structure of the issue.  We have also estimated multinomial logit 
models in which firms face a choice of not to issue, to issue short-term, or to issue long-term (and similarly with 
security).  As the results from each specification are similar, we choose to report results from the simpler 






agency conflicts.   The results are also largely consistent with Flannery (1986) in that short-term debt 
issuers seem to be higher quality in that they are older, larger and have more growth options compared to 
long-term debt issuers.   
Columns 4, 5, and 6 of Table VIII report estimates of equation (5). These estimates for bond 
security are more ambiguous than those for maturity.  For the low-growth dummy, the coefficient is 
positive and significantly different from zero.  However, the coefficients on the other financial condition 
variables are insignificantly different from zero with opposite signs from one another. 
In addition, the results from Table VIII document other factors that affect the decision to use 
secured debt. These results suggest that firms issuing secured debt tend to be smaller and much more 
highly levered than unsecured issuers.  Firms also tend to issue secured debt when they have high fixed 
asset ratios and after periods of poor stock returns.  They tend to hold more cash, which tends to indicate 
that they are concerned about liquidity constraints in the future.  These findings are consistent with the 
‘banking’ view of secured debt (Berger and Udell (1990)), in which poor quality firms have little choice 
but to issue secured debt as investors are more likely to require direct collateral when the firm is nearing 
bankruptcy.  They do not support the ‘corporate finance’ view, in which high quality firms issue secured 
debt to avoid underinvestment problems associated with the priority of existing debt claims (Stulz and 
Johnson (1985), Smith and Warner (1979), and Berkovitch and Kim (1990)).  
B.  Private Loans 
We now examine the way in which macroeconomic conditions and firm-specific factors affect the 
structure of private loans.  As with our analysis of public debt offerings, we classify private loans by 
maturity and security level.   As before, we consider a loan or collection of loans to be short-term if the 
weighted maturity is less than five years, and classify the loans as secured if the proceeds-weighted 
secured dummy is larger than or equal to 0.5. We then estimate equations predicting the factors that affect 
whether a loan is short or long-term, and whether or not it is secured.  Similar to the equations (4) and (5) 
estimated for bonds, we restrict our sample to those firm-months for which a loan was issued, and 






Table IX presents estimates of these equations.  The first three columns report estimates of the 
factors that affect the choice between short-term and long-term loans.  Similar to public bonds, the 
conditional probability of obtaining a short-term loan increases during economic downturns and 
tightening credit markets, consistent with the hypothesis that firms turn away from more information-
sensitive loans during downturns.  In addition, firms that get short-term private loans tend to be smaller, 
have lower debt levels, and are less likely to have obtained a credit rating compared to firms that obtain 
long-term loans.  These findings are in contrast to those for short-term bond issuers, who tend to be larger 
firms that have credit ratings.  
The last three columns of Table IX report estimates of equations predicting whether a given loan 
will be secured or unsecured. The coefficients on the three indicators of financial market conditions are 
positive and statistically significant.  These results suggest, consistent with the information-sensitivity 
arguments, that weak credit conditions are associated with a higher use of secured relative to unsecured 
loans.  Security lessens the importance of information asymmetries, which tend to increase in worse 
financial conditions. 
The effect of macroeconomic conditions on security appears to be different for loans, where 
market downturns clearly increase the likelihood of security, than for bonds, where this effect is 
significant only for one of three measures of financial conditions.  One possible explanation is that 
secured public debt is relatively rare, with only 5 percent of issues being secured.  In contrast, 79% of 
private loans in our sample are secured.  Thus, it is not surprising that the results for security are more 
unambiguous for the sample of loans, where security is a common feature, than for bonds, where it is not.  
In addition, the same firm-level factors that lead firms to issue secured public debt lead firms to 
use secured private loans.  In particular, firms obtaining secured loans tend to be younger, smaller, highly 
levered with low interest coverage and weak cash flows.   This pattern strongly supports the ‘banking 
view’ of secured debt, in which firms tend to use secured debt in situations in which lenders are unwilling 
to lend absent security.  It is counter to the ‘corporate finance’ view, in which firms use secured debt as a 






C.  Combinations of Issue Features 
  The previous analysis considered each provision separately and estimated the factors that lead 
firms to choose each one.  However, in practice, the features are agreed to at the same time, and 
undoubtedly they are negotiated as a group rather than individually.  To mirror the joint decision process, 
we estimate a model in which the features of the debt are estimated simultaneously. 
  We first consider combinations of securities that are observed, and rank them according to their 
expected sensitivity to market conditions.  In addition to public bonds, we include loans and equity 
offerings in this analysis.  We rank the possibilities from least to most sensitive to market-wide 
conditions:  no issue, short-term secured loan, short-term unsecured loan, long-term secured loan, long-
term unsecured loan, secured bond, short-term unsecured bond, long-term unsecured bond, convertible 
bond, and seasoned equity issue.  
  We estimate these combinations of features using an ordered logit model similar to equation (1) 
where j is now from 0 (no issue) to 9 (SEO) based on above ranking.  The results are presented in Table 
X.  Market conditions appear to have a large impact on the likelihood that a firm uses a more information-
sensitive security.  Each of the three measures of market conditions, the recession dummy variable, the 
low-growth dummy, and the survey-based measure of credit tightness, has a negative coefficient and is 
highly statistically significantly different from zero.  This finding confirms the results discussed above, in 
which the most information-sensitive securities are used in expansions while the least-information 
sensitive securities are used during market downturns. 
   
VI.  The Determinants of Credit Quality of Public Debt 
In addition to the features of the debt contracts, we are also interested in the factors that affect the 
credit quality of the bond.  Consequently, we estimate equations predicting the bond’s quality, measured 
by its rating. We estimate these equations using a multinomial logit setup similar to equation (2) in which 






B-rated, investment grade B-rated, and A-rated bonds.  The baseline corresponds to the firm choosing not 
to issue any kind of debt. 
  Table XI reports coefficient estimates from equations predicting the credit quality of a firm’s 
bond issue.  This table contains three panels, each of which utilizes an alternative measure of market 
conditions.  Some of the results are not particularly surprising as they correspond to the firm 
characteristics associated with bond ratings of different types.  For example, larger firms, and firms with 
higher market to book, higher cash flows and better coverage ratios are more likely to issue high-rated 
debt than low-rated debt, while more levered firms are more likely to issue low-rated debt.  
A clear finding from Table XI concerns the impact of market downturns on bond ratings.       
Regardless of which measure of market conditions is used, the estimates indicate that weaker market 
conditions correspond to a shift in the distribution of issued bonds towards higher credit ratings.   
Consistent with the commonly discussed arguments of practitioners, during bad economic times, poor 
quality borrowers appear to be shut out of the bond market.  The estimated effect is fairly large. For 
example, holding other factors constant, the econometric model implies that a recession decreases the 
likelihood of a not-rated bond issue by 12%.  The only bonds that are not affected by poor economic 
times are highly-rated ones.  In other words, the fact that the quality of bonds issued is strongly 
countercyclical is evidence consistent with the view that financial constraints are exacerbated during 
recessions.     
A somewhat counterintuitive finding is the strong negative relation between cash holdings and 
the probability of issuing investment grade debt.  This finding is consistent with the logic of Almeida, 
Campello and Weisbach (2004, 2009), who argue that more financially constrained firms are likely to 
save a higher percentage of cash from their cash flows.  Since firms with low bond ratings are more likely 
to face financial constraints, they will tend to save more cash, leading to a negative relation between 
firms’ cash holdings and the ratings of the bonds they issue.  This finding complements the results from 






consistent with constrained firms holding more cash and using security as a way of enabling access to 
credit. 
  
VII.  Conclusion 
Macroeconomic conditions can affect firms’ ability to raise capital, as well as the manner in 
which they do so.  Theories based on asymmetric information suggest that the highest quality firms will 
be relatively unaffected by a market downturn.  However, some lesser quality firms will be forced to shift 
from direct issuances of debt to intermediated debt, while other lesser quality firms will be shut out of the 
capital markets altogether (Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)).  In addition, market downturns can force 
riskier firms to rely on intermediated debt rather than direct issuances (Diamond (1991a)) or shut these 
firms out of the capital market completely (Bernanke and Gertler (1989)).  To the extent that a worsening 
of overall market conditions can exacerbate information problems, information-based theories also imply 
that such a worsening of market conditions leads to firms’ using less information sensitive securities to 
raise capital. 
We evaluate these predictions empirically using a sample of security issuances by US 
corporations, including 7,746 seasoned equity offerings, 21,657 public debt offerings, and 40,097 private 
loans.  Our results suggest that the likelihood that a firm raises capital decreases when overall market 
conditions worsen, regardless of whether we measure this worsening by an NBER-defined recession, the 
growth rate of GDP, or credit tightness due to a Federal Reserve Survey of bankers.   Controlling for the 
identity of the issuing firm, we find that a macroeconomic downturn increases the likelihood that the firm 
issues a less information sensitive security, i.e., convertibles or nonconvertible debt rather than equity.  
We also find that market downturns lead banks to prefer higher quality borrowers, although the results on 
the quantity of loans over the business cycle are more ambiguous.   
In addition to the choice of securities, we also consider the possibility that macroeconomic factors 
affect the structure of securities. In particular, we examine how overall market conditions affect the 






the view that poor macroeconomic conditions lead firms to structure securities in ways that lessen their 
information sensitivity.  In particular, holding other factors fixed, a downturn tends to decrease the 
expected maturity of both public bonds and private loans and to increase the likelihood that these bonds 
and loans are secured.   
Finally, we consider the way in which the quality of the securities, measured by their ratings, 
changes over business cycles.  For our sample of public bonds, we find that market downturns do not 
affect or even increase the issuances of high quality bonds. However downturns are associated with a 
significant drop in the likelihood of a junk or unrated bond issue.  
Overall, our results are consistent with the view that macroeconomic conditions are important 
determinants of the structure of securities issued, and, equally importantly, of the ability of firms to raise 
capital at all.  Consistent with commonly-stated arguments of practitioners as well as models of 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989), higher quality bonds are relatively 
unaffected by market-wide factors, but lower-quality bonds appear to be noticeably more difficult to issue 
during market downturns.  In addition, firms appear to substitute away from information-sensitive 
securities toward less information-sensitive securities. 
These findings appear to justify the concerns of Passov (2003) that firms with less than stellar 
bond ratings could conceivably be shut out of the capital markets during down cycles.  Indeed, in the well-
known Graham and Harvey (2001) survey of Chief Financial Officers, the two most common concerns in 
debt policy were maintaining financial flexibility and bond ratings (p. 210).  Consistent with this survey 
evidence are Kisgen (2008) and Hovakimian et al. (2009), who document that firms do appear to target 
bond ratings rather than debt levels.  Our findings suggest that the concern about bond ratings is potentially 
warranted, since firms with poor bond ratings potentially are shut out of the capital markets during 
downturns. 
While this paper documents substantial relations between security issuances and market conditions, 
it raises as many questions as it answers.  The results are consistent with a number of alternative models, 






hazard or ex-ante asymmetric information considerations? To what extent are the patterns presented above 
a consequence of supply shocks, as emphasized by the formal models, or do they reflect shifts in demand 
for capital over the business cycle?  When do these market imperfections justify government intervention 
to stabilize capital markets, as in the response to the Financial Crisis of 2008?  What covenants potentially 
mitigate the asymmetric information problems affecting debt issuances during market downturns, and can 
we predict when such covenants should or should not be adopted?  The answers to these and other 
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This data appendix describes the primary variables of interest.  All firm characteristics, unless noted otherwise, 
represent beginning-of-year values.  Data sources, included in the last column, include Compustat, CSRP, Loan 
Pricing Corporation's Dealscan, Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database, SDC Global New Issues Database, US 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Bureau of Economic Research, and the US Federal Reserve Board. 
Variable Definition  Source 
    
Bond Issuance Proceeds  Total proceeds raised through a public bond offering in 
a given month 
Mergent FISD 
Bond Maturity Dummy  Set equal to one if the proceeds-weighted initial 
maturity of bonds issued in a given month is less than 
5 years, zero otherwise 
Mergent FISD 
Bond Security Dummy  Set equal to one if the proceeds-weighted initial 
secured bond dummy a given month is greater than 
0.5, zero otherwise 
Mergent FISD 
Cash  Cash and short-term investments, scaled by total assets  Compustat 
Cash Flow  Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation, 
scaled by the book value of total assets 
Compustat 
Convertible Bond Proceeds  Total proceeds raised through a convertible bond 
offering in a given month 
Mergent FISD 
Credit Quality   Obtained from Moody's credit ratings and classified as 
follows: 0 - not rated, 1 - C to Caa1, 2 - B3 to Ba1, 3 - 
Baa3 to Baa1, 4 - A3 to Aaa 
Mergent FISD 
Equity Issuance Proceeds  Total proceeds raised through a seasoned equity 
offering in a given month 
SDC Global  
Financing Choice Variable for the 
Multinomial and Ordered Logit 
Models 
Classified as following for each firm-month:  0 - No 
issue, 1 - Loan, 2 - Bond, 3 - Convertible, 4 - Seasoned 
equity offering.  In months with multiple issues, the 
classification is determined by the largest issue in 
terms of proceeds raised 
Dealscan, Mergent 
FISD, SDC Global  
Fixed Asset Ratio  Net property, plant and equipment scaled by the book 
value of total assets 
Compustat 
Inverse Interest Coverage  log(1+(Interest Expense/EBIT))  Compustat 
Leverage  Long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, scaled 
by the book value of total assets 
Compustat 
Loan Maturity Dummy  Set equal to one if the proceeds-weighted initial 
maturity of loans obtained in a given month is less than 
5 years, zero otherwise 
Dealscan 
Loan Proceeds  Total proceeds raised through a bank loan in a given 
month 
Dealscan 
Loan Security Dummy  Set equal to one if the proceeds-weighted initial 
secured loan dummy a given month is greater than 0.5, 
zero otherwise 
Dealscan 
Log(Total Assets)  Natural logarithm of the book value of assets in 







Low Growth Dummy  Set equal to one in quarters in which GDP growth was 
below the 25th percentile of growth between 1971 and 
2007, zero otherwise 
BEA 
Market to Book  Book value of total debt plus the liquidating value of 
preferred stock plus the market value of equity, scaled 
by the book value of total assets 
Compustat 
Rated Firm Dummy  Indicator set equal to 1 if a firm has an S&P domestic 
long-term issuer credit rating, zero otherwise 
Compustat 
Recession Dummy  Set equal to one in months designated as recession by 
the NBER 
NBER 
Sales Growth  Percentage change in sales over the previous year  Compustat 
Secured Bond Dummy  Set equal for to one if an issued bond is classified as 
secured 
Mergent FISD 
Secured Loan Dummy  Set equal for to one if a bank loan is classified as 
secured 
Dealscan 
Stock Return  Previous 12-month stock return  CRSP 
Term Spread  Difference in the yields on ten-year treasuries and one-
year treasuries. 
Federal Reserve 
Weak Credit Dummy  Set equal to one in months when the net percentage of 
senior loan officers tightening standards for large to 







Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
The sample includes all SEOs, convertible bonds, other public debt, and private loans issued by US industrial 
firms that have corresponding accounting information in Compustat as of the fiscal year-end immediately prior 
to the issue. Sample period is between 1971 and 2007, except for private loans where the data is only available 
after 1988. We divide the sample into six expansion periods and five recession periods based on the NBER 
classification. For each sub-period, we report the averages of proceeds raised per month in constant 2000 $US 
for each of the four security types.  
 
SEOs Convertibles Public Bonds Private Loans
January 1971-October 1973 395.3 29.5 936.1 -
November 1973-March 1975 (recession) 137.2 16.9 1,632.1 -
April 1975-December 1979 308.0 35.8 1,096.3 -
January 1980-July 1980 (recession) 393.1 42.0 2,937.7 -
August 1980-June 1981 1,085.1 141.3 1,626.2 -
July 1981-November 1982 (recession) 413.6 76.7 1,498.2 -
December 1982-June 1990 710.9 477.6 3,965.5 11,915.9
July 1990-March 1991(recession) 391.9 955.3 4,000.6 7,504.1
April 1991-February 2001 2,090.5 1,984.5 16,451.4 28,078.9
March 2001-November 2001(recession) 1,677.9 8,264.4 35,598.8 48,832.1
December 2001-December 2007 1,680.4 4,948.9 19,623.0 38,876.3
All 844.0 1,543.0 8,124.2 12,291.6













Macro Economic Conditions and Security Issues 
 
This table presents the averages of relative proportions of proceeds raised through four types of securities 
within each calendar month.  The sample includes all SEOs, convertible bonds, other public debt, and private 
loans issued by US industrial firms that have corresponding accounting information in Compustat as of the 
fiscal year-end immediately prior to the issue.  Sample period is between 1971 and 2007, except for private 
loans where the data is only available after 1988. Expansions and recessions are based on the NBER 
classification. A month is defined as low growth if GDP growth in that particular quarter is below the 25
th 
percentile of economic growth over the entire sample period.  A month with weak credit supply takes a value 
of one if the net percentage of senior loan officers tightening standards for loans to large and medium firms is 
positive for that particular quarter. This classification is based on a Federal Reserve survey available since the 
2
nd quarter of 1990. For each calendar month, we first calculate the relative proportions of each of the four 
security types within that month. Panel A reports the monthly averages for the first half of sample period, till 
1987, while panel B reports the monthly averages since 1988, when private loan data became available.  
 
Panel A: 1971 to 1987
Numbef of
months SEOs Convertibles Public Bonds
Expanson 162 25.7% 4.0% 70.3%
Recession 41 18.6% 2.9% 78.5%
t-stat(difference) -1.78 -0.97 1.95
High GDP growth 144 25.6% 4.2% 70.2%
Low GDP growth 59 21.2% 2.7% 76.1%
t-stat(difference) -1.24 -1.56 1.59
Averages of Relative Proceeds within Month (%)
 
 
Panel B: 1988 to 2007
Numbef of
months SEOs Convertibles Public Bonds Private Loans
Expanson 222 4.0% 5.3% 29.9% 60.7%
Recession 18 2.5% 8.3% 34.8% 54.4%
t-stat(difference) -1.75 2.57 1.44 -1.65
High GDP growth 180 4.1% 5.3% 30.0% 60.6%
Low GDP growth 60 3.2% 6.3% 31.2% 59.3%
t-stat(difference) -1.70 1.44 0.58 -0.56
Strong Credit Supply 108 3.9% 4.1% 26.6% 65.4%
Weak Credit Supply 105 4.3% 7.3% 34.8% 53.5%
t-stat(difference) 0.88 5.26 4.52 -5.96









Macro Economic Conditions and Types of Public Debt Issues 
 
This table presents the averages of relative proportions of proceeds raised through public debt issues with various characteristics. Short-term 
months are those firm-months with proceeds-weighted initial maturities shorter than or equal to 5 years. Short-term debts are only available since 
1985. Secured months are those firm-months with proceeds-weighted issue-level secured dummy greater than or equal to 0.5.  We group all public 
debt into five categories based on credit ratings from Moody’s; not rated,  C's(C to Caa1), speculative B's (B3 to Ba1), investable B's (Baa3 to 
Baa1), and A's (A3 to Aaa).  Expansions and recessions are based on the NBER classification. A month is defined as low growth if GDP growth in 
that particular quarter is below the 25
th percentile of economic growth over the entire sample period.  A month is defined as with weak credit 
supply if the net percentage of senior loan officers tightening standards for loans to large and medium firms is positive for that particular quarter, 
and is based on Federal Reserve survey. For each calendar month, we first calculate the relative proportions of each of the bond types out of total 
proceeds raised from public debt within that month.  Panel A reports the monthly averages for the full sample period, while panel B reports the 
monthly averages since the 2
nd quarter of 1990, when the Federal Reserve survey became available. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample Period
Numbef of
months Short term Secured Non Rated C's(C to Caa1) Speculative B's Investable B's A's (A3 to Aaa)
Expanson 381 13.2% 5.3% 6.2% 3.7% 25.8% 18.7% 45.6%
Recession 58 22.9% 4.8% 2.7% 1.2% 14.4% 15.7% 66.0%
t-stat(difference) 2.80 -0.24 -2.12 -2.57 -3.97 -1.35 5.70
High GDP growth 321 13.1% 4.6% 6.5% 3.8% 26.2% 18.6% 45.0%
Low GDP growth 118 16.3% 6.8% 3.8% 2.4% 19.0% 17.7% 57.2%
t-stat(difference) 1.53 1.65 -2.09 -1.88 -3.31 -0.52 4.40
Panel B: 1990 2nd Quarter to Dec. 2007
Numbef of
months Short term Secured Non Rated C's(C to Caa1) Speculative B's Investable B's A's (A3 to Aaa)
Expanson 195 14.3% 3.9% 3.1% 2.8% 32.8% 23.2% 38.0%
Recession 18 22.9% 0.7% 1.2% 0.5% 14.5% 26.8% 56.9%
t-stat(difference) 2.45 -3.01 -1.87 -2.60 -4.76 1.12 3.96
High GDP growth 156 14.2% 4.0% 3.2% 2.8% 34.2% 22.6% 37.2%
Low GDP growth 57 17.1% 2.7% 2.3% 2.1% 23.2% 26.1% 46.3%
t-stat(difference) 1.28 -1.85 -1.51 -1.35 -4.51 1.74 3.02
Strong Credit Supply 108 11.2% 3.8% 3.6% 3.4% 36.4% 22.8% 33.7%
Weak Credit Supply 105 18.9% 3.5% 2.3% 1.8% 25.9% 24.3% 45.7%
t-stat(difference) 3.98 -0.61 -2.35 -3.41 -4.94 0.87 4.54
Averages of Relative Proceeds within Month (%)






Firm Characteristics by Security Issues: Univariate Analysis 
 
This table presents the averages of firm characteristics for the four security types over the sample period. 
These characteristics are natural logarithm of the total assets, leverage, market to book, cash flow, cash, the 
inverse of interest coverage, a debt-rating dummy, sales growth, and the stock return. Inverse interest 
coverage is defined as the natural logarithm of (1+interest/EBIT) and stock return is calculated over the 
previous twelve months.  Panel A reports the results for the first half of the sample period, from 1971 until 
1987, while panel B reports the results since 1988, when private loan data became available. 
 
Panel A: 1971 to 1987
No Issue Issue SEOs CBs Bonds
Firm Age 11.533 12.891 9.494 14.366 17.707
Log(Total Assets) 4.697 5.555 4.242 5.334 7.544
Leverage 0.276 0.306 0.296 0.299 0.324
Market to Book 1.231 1.525 1.936 1.459 0.925
Fixed Asset Ratio 0.353 0.417 0.363 0.366 0.506
Cash Flow 0.062 0.078 0.070 0.088 0.088
Cash 0.106 0.087 0.106 0.114 0.054
Inverse Interest Coverage 0.205 0.235 0.206 0.263 0.273
Rated Firm Dummy 0.052 0.181 0.045 0.405 0.347
Sales Growth 0.188 0.311 0.412 0.351 0.155
Stock Return 0.193 0.622 0.893 0.579 0.221
Term Spread 0.784 0.973 0.875 1.183 1.086
Recession Dummy 0.188 0.141 0.130 0.070 0.169
Low Growth Dummy 0.269 0.207 0.209 0.086 0.223
N 461,020           4,244               2,384               257                  1,603              
Averages per Firm-Months Observations
 
Panel B: 1988 to 2007
No Issue Issue SEOs CBs Bonds Loans
Firm Age 14.479 16.966 9.746 15.907 22.781 16.297
Log(Total Assets) 4.561 5.849 4.271 6.101 7.522 5.485
Leverage 0.281 0.332 0.260 0.299 0.409 0.320
Market to Book 1.765 1.646 2.808 2.323 1.325 1.445
Fixed Asset Ratio 0.287 0.335 0.285 0.261 0.417 0.321
Cash Flow -0.029 0.029 -0.057 0.004 0.067 0.036
Cash 0.167 0.112 0.236 0.228 0.060 0.094
Inverse Interest Coverage 0.184 0.243 0.161 0.134 0.312 0.243
Rated Firm Dummy 0.234 0.507 0.192 0.543 0.922 0.403
Sales Growth 0.179 0.270 0.543 0.364 0.194 0.231
Stock Return 0.171 0.341 1.022 0.593 0.216 0.191
Term Spread 1.200 1.229 1.299 1.354 1.269 1.183
Recession Dummy 0.073 0.066 0.046 0.078 0.071 0.068
Low Growth Dummy 0.236 0.212 0.190 0.236 0.214 0.214
Weak Credit Dummy 0.489 0.469 0.435 0.529 0.482 0.465
N 936,776        34,846          4,492            2,140            8,280            19,975         






An Ordered Logit Model of Security Choice 
This table reports coefficient estimates for an ordered logit model. The dependent variable takes the following 
values: 0 (not issuing any type of security), 1 (bank loan), 2 (straight public bond), 3 (convertible debt), and 4 
(SEO). The sample period is from 1988 to 2007 in Columns 1 and 2 and from second quarter of 1990 to 2007 
in Column 3. Firm-level controls are natural logarithm of the total assets, leverage, market to book, cash flow, 
cash, the inverse of interest coverage, a debt-rating dummy, sales growth, and the stock return. Inverse 
interest coverage is defined as the natural logarithm of (1+interest/EBIT) and stock return is calculated over 
the previous twelve months. Our macro-level control is the term spread, defined as the difference between the 
yields on ten-year treasuries and one-year treasuries. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of 
observations at the firm level. Robust z statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate 




Firm Age -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(5.31)*** (5.25)*** (5.62)***
ln(Total Assets) 0.223 0.224 0.220
(24.48)*** (24.59)*** (23.89)***
Leverage 0.475 0.476 0.471
(9.12)*** (9.15)*** (8.93)***
Market-to-Book 0.032 0.033 0.028
(6.15)*** (6.22)*** (5.16)***
Fixed-Assets Ratio -0.083 -0.088 -0.039
(1.29) (1.35) (0.60)
Cash Flow -0.020 -0.022 0.003
(0.50) (0.55) (0.07)
Cash -0.866 -0.862 -0.840
(12.82)*** (12.77)*** (12.44)***
Inverse Interest Coverage -0.041 -0.041 -0.034
(2.68)*** (2.65)*** (2.09)**
Debt Rating Dummy 0.563 0.562 0.569
(21.95)*** (21.91)*** (22.07)***
Sales Growth 0.362 0.360 0.361
(29.75)*** (29.65)*** (29.31)***
Stock Return 0.163 0.162 0.157
(18.52)*** (18.56)*** (18.21)***




Low Growth Dummy -0.116
(7.25)***
Weak Credit Dummy -0.083
(5.83)***
Industry FEs yes yes yes
Observations 737,433 737,433 666,424







A Multinomial Logit Model of Security Choice 
This table reports coefficient estimates for a multinomial logit model. The dependent variable includes four different types of security issuance: 
bank loan, public bond, convertible debt, and SEO. The base outcome is not issuing any type of security. Inverse interest coverage is defined as 
() ) interest ( 1 ln EBIT + .  The sample period is from 1988 to 2007 in Panels A and B and from the second quarter of 1990 to 2007 in Panel C. Standard 
errors are corrected for clustering of observations at the firm level. Robust z statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Loan Bond Convert SEO Loan Bond Convert SEO Loan Bond Convert SEO
Firm Age -0.005 0.005 -0.017 -0.044 -0.005 0.005 -0.017 -0.044 -0.005 0.005 -0.017 -0.044
(4.47)*** (2.38)** (4.46)*** (15.89)*** (4.38)*** (2.36)** (4.49)*** (15.81)*** (4.99)*** (2.26)** (4.40)*** (15.58)***
ln(Total Assets) 0.172 0.429 0.366 0.042 0.173 0.431 0.366 0.043 0.171 0.417 0.369 0.033
(19.57)*** (17.01)*** (13.54)*** (3.22)*** (19.63)*** (17.09)*** (13.52)*** (3.35)*** (19.29)*** (16.34)*** (13.37)*** (2.41)**
Leverage 0.267 1.026 1.049 0.542 0.267 1.030 1.050 0.541 0.238 1.027 1.075 0.579
(5.23)*** (7.00)*** (8.38)*** (7.40)*** (5.25)*** (7.03)*** (8.41)*** (7.37)*** (4.57)*** (6.85)*** (8.54)*** (7.82)***
Market-to-Book 0.004 0.044 0.021 0.052 0.004 0.045 0.021 0.052 -0.003 0.035 0.015 0.052
(0.58) (1.81)* (1.72)* (7.86)*** (0.60) (1.84)* (1.76)* (7.96)*** (0.43) (1.38) (1.22) (7.67)***
Fixed-Assets Ratio -0.396 0.560 -0.815 0.185 -0.400 0.554 -0.813 0.181 -0.341 0.605 -0.790 0.218
(6.15)*** (3.51)*** (3.64)*** (1.64) (6.21)*** (3.47)*** (3.63)*** (1.60) (5.32)*** (3.75)*** (3.45)*** (1.87)*
Cash Flow 0.334 0.185 -0.007 0.057 0.332 0.189 -0.004 0.055 0.371 0.227 0.042 0.071
(4.90)*** (0.82) (0.06) (0.98) (4.88)*** (0.84) (0.03) (0.95) (5.27)*** (0.97) (0.35) (1.20)
Cash -2.040 -2.047 1.255 0.302 -2.036 -2.043 1.252 0.307 -2.037 -1.943 1.252 0.324
(23.11)*** (5.52)*** (7.02)*** (3.09)*** (23.07)*** (5.50)*** (7.00)*** (3.14)*** (22.77)*** (5.20)*** (6.96)*** (3.23)***
Inverse Interest Coverage -0.023 -0.107 -0.210 0.056 -0.023 -0.107 -0.211 0.056 -0.016 -0.097 -0.203 0.060
(1.33) (2.56)** (3.98)*** (1.57) (1.31) (2.55)** (3.97)*** (1.56) (0.87) (2.27)** (3.50)*** (1.60)
Debt Rating Dummy 0.237 2.503 0.843 0.051 0.236 2.501 0.843 0.049 0.243 2.513 0.781 0.079
(8.16)*** (22.51)*** (7.27)*** (0.89) (8.13)*** (22.54)*** (7.27)*** (0.85) (8.33)*** (22.22)*** (6.61)*** (1.33)
Sales Growth 0.308 0.545 0.333 0.369 0.306 0.543 0.331 0.369 0.307 0.532 0.334 0.371
(20.63)*** (13.26)*** (10.08)*** (22.34)*** (20.45)*** (13.26)*** (10.01)*** (22.33)*** (20.13)*** (12.81)*** (9.90)*** (22.10)***
Stock Return 0.042 0.156 0.199 0.232 0.040 0.151 0.198 0.233 0.030 0.152 0.192 0.229
(4.23)*** (7.50)*** (9.12)*** (16.84)*** (3.94)*** (7.03)*** (9.02)*** (16.94)*** (2.85)*** (7.31)*** (8.82)*** (16.73)***
Term Spread 0.692 8.098 17.243 13.425 -0.192 7.319 17.829 11.921 -2.665 5.564 15.837 10.324
(1.01) (5.24)*** (6.59)*** (9.28)*** (0.27) (4.51)*** (6.90)*** (8.05)*** (3.74)*** (3.37)*** (6.02)*** (6.79)***
Recession Dummy -0.045 0.065 0.178 -0.340
(1.58) (1.20) (1.81)* (4.42)***
Low Growth Dummy -0.125 -0.126 0.050 -0.203
(6.56)*** (3.49)*** (0.88) (4.81)***
Weak Credit Dummy -0.112 -0.039 0.109 -0.228
(7.18)*** (1.07) (2.02)** (6.62)***
Constant -4.411 -10.023 -9.495 -5.374 -4.379 -9.987 -9.499 -5.344 -4.230 -9.875 -9.402 -5.158


















An Ordered Logit Model of Credit Quality of Bank Borrowers 
This table reports coefficient estimates for an ordered logit model only for private loans in our sample. The 
dependent variable takes the following values: 0 (not rated), 1 (C to Caa1 rated), 2 (B3 to Ba1 rated), 3 (Baa3 
to Baa1 rated), and 4 (A3 to Aaa rated), using bond ratings for the borrowing firms. The sample period is 
from 1988 to 2007 in Columns 1 and 2 and from second quarter of 1990 to 2007 in Column 3. Firm-level 
controls are natural logarithm of the total assets, leverage, market to book, cash flow, cash, the inverse of 
interest coverage, a debt-rating dummy, sales growth, and the stock return. Inverse interest coverage is 
defined as the natural logarithm of (1+interest/EBIT) and stock return is calculated over the previous twelve 
months. Our macro-level control is the term spread, defined as the difference between the yields on ten-year 
treasuries and one-year treasuries. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of observations at the firm level. 
Robust z statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Age 0.025 0.024 0.024
(7.97)*** (7.92)*** (7.73)***
ln(Total Assets) 0.925 0.923 0.959
(29.04)*** (28.99)*** (30.24)***
Leverage 1.457 1.447 1.493
(8.68)*** (8.63)*** (8.96)***
Market-to-Book 0.167 0.169 0.128
(5.08)*** (5.14)*** (3.76)***
Fixed-Assets Ratio -0.989 -0.983 -0.909
(4.20)*** (4.16)*** (3.88)***
Cash Flow 1.870 1.854 2.218
(4.71)*** (4.69)*** (5.29)***
Cash -0.879 -0.943 -0.587
(2.24)** (2.39)** (1.51)
Inverse Interest Coverage -0.252 -0.250 -0.239
(4.19)*** (4.12)*** (3.98)***
Sales Growth -0.013 -0.026 -0.011
(0.18) (0.37) (0.16)
Stock Return 0.024 0.028 0.082
(0.74) (0.84) (2.84)***




Low Growth Dummy 0.199
(3.87)***
Weak Credit Dummy 0.626
(13.79)***
Industry FEs yes yes yes
Observations 15,997 15,997 15,236








Factors affecting the Maturity and Security of Bonds:  Logit Model 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates for a logit model. The sample includes only public bond issuances and 
their characteristics from 1985 to 2007 in the first three columns (since there is no short-term bond issue 
before 1985 in our sample) and from 1971 to 2007 in the last three columns. Also, in columns (3) and (6), 
where we include weak credit dummy, the sample period is from the second quarter of 1990 to 2007. The 
dependent variable is equal to one if the public debt issued is short-term in columns (1) through (3), or 
secured in columns (4) through (6). 
 
( 1 )( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
Firm Age 0.017 0.016 0.019 -0.011 -0.010 0.002
(3.62)*** (3.47)*** (4.04)*** (0.88) (0.86) (0.12)
ln(Total Assets) 0.287 0.288 0.263 -0.233 -0.254 -0.571
(7.27)*** (7.26)*** (6.30)*** (2.07)** (2.15)** (4.72)***
Leverage 0.141 0.135 0.026 1.813 1.829 1.866
(0.32) (0.31) (0.06) (3.05)*** (3.09)*** (3.44)***
Market-to-Book 0.214 0.222 0.188 -0.839 -0.835 -0.702
(4.21)*** (4.36)*** (3.54)*** (2.47)** (2.52)** (2.35)**
Fixed-Assets Ratio -0.791 -0.798 -0.772 2.822 2.861 0.864
(2.33)** (2.36)** (2.10)** (3.47)*** (3.53)*** (0.80)
Cash Flow -1.336 -1.330 -1.294 -1.385 -1.429 -1.208
(2.15)** (2.15)** (2.03)** (1.16) (1.22) (1.19)
Cash -1.567 -1.673 -1.448 2.404 2.571 2.438
(1.89)* (2.01)** (1.74)* (2.61)*** (2.81)*** (2.32)**
Inverse Interest Coverage 0.012 0.014 0.030 0.174 0.161 0.202
(0.08) (0.10) (0.22) (1.06) (0.97) (0.97)
Debt Rating Dummy -0.292 -0.284 -0.428 -0.365 -0.290 0.291
(1.26) (1.23) (1.48) (1.67)* (1.25) (0.79)
Sales Growth -0.364 -0.379 -0.479 -0.059 -0.048 -0.013
(2.04)** (2.10)** (2.32)** (0.27) (0.23) (0.06)
Stock Return -0.391 -0.392 -0.255 -0.512 -0.476 -0.483
(2.83)*** (2.83)*** (2.03)** (3.37)*** (3.22)*** (3.02)***
Term Spread -15.112 -13.264 -13.272 4.033 7.368 18.614
(3.34)*** (2.97)*** (2.78)*** (0.41) (0.78) (2.02)**
Recession Dummy 0.410 -0.244
(3.36)*** (1.19)
Low Growth Dummy 0.140 0.439
(1.67)* (2.88)***
Weak Credit Dummy 0.437 0.239
(4.42)*** (1.19)
Constant -4.474 -4.487 -4.454 -21.222 -21.347 -20.585
(7.88)*** (7.95)*** (7.42)*** (16.79)*** (17.45)*** (16.29)***
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,702 7,702 6,817 8,498 8,499 6,817
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.19 0.20 0.24











Factors affecting the Maturity and Security of Bank Loans: Logit Model  
 
This table reports coefficient estimates for a logit model. The sample includes bank loans only and their 
characteristics. The dependent variable is equal to one if the private loan is short-term in columns (1) through 
(3), or secured in columns (4) through (6). The sample period is from 1988 to 2007, except for in Columns (3) 
and (6). In columns (3) and (6), where we include weak-credit dummy, the sample period is from the second 
quarter of 1990 to 2007. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm Age 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(0.94) (0.85) (1.02) (4.13)*** (4.23)*** (4.03)***
ln(Total Assets) -0.073 -0.073 -0.066 -0.744 -0.750 -0.766
(3.65)*** (3.64)*** (3.20)*** (23.20)*** (23.23)*** (23.19)***
Leverage -0.715 -0.716 -0.768 2.347 2.353 2.317
(5.88)*** (5.89)*** (6.07)*** (10.79)*** (10.77)*** (10.60)***
Market-to-Book 0.072 0.073 0.062 -0.156 -0.157 -0.147
(3.28)*** (3.33)*** (2.77)*** (5.76)*** (5.79)*** (5.51)***
Fixed-Assets Ratio -0.098 -0.097 -0.063 -0.539 -0.537 -0.572
(0.68) (0.67) (0.42) (2.46)** (2.45)** (2.57)**
Cash Flow -1.708 -1.712 -1.742 -4.403 -4.393 -5.074
(6.49)*** (6.52)*** (6.91)*** (8.34)*** (8.27)*** (10.90)***
Cash -0.528 -0.554 -0.423 0.801 0.802 0.773
(2.61)*** (2.74)*** (2.01)** (2.46)** (2.47)** (2.30)**
Inverse Interest Coverage -0.029 -0.025 -0.028 0.314 0.315 0.328
(0.72) (0.61) (0.65) (4.91)*** (4.90)*** (4.84)***
Debt Rating Dummy -0.310 -0.311 -0.373 0.429 0.435 0.446
(4.76)*** (4.76)*** (5.54)*** (4.57)*** (4.63)*** (4.63)***
Sales Growth -0.170 -0.184 -0.163 -0.001 0.008 0.024
(3.90)*** (4.22)*** (3.62)*** (0.01) (0.11) (0.31)
Stock Return -0.105 -0.108 -0.088 0.060 0.068 0.058
(4.46)*** (4.57)*** (3.68)*** (1.57) (1.79)* (1.49)
Term Spread 27.195 29.230 29.845 1.735 4.197 3.592
(15.33)*** (16.07)*** (15.83)*** (0.68) (1.60) (1.36)
Recession Dummy 0.655 0.188
(7.95)*** (1.79)*
Low Growth Dummy 0.109 0.315
(2.54)** (4.69)***
Weak Credit Dummy 0.587 0.224
(14.99)*** (4.12)***
Constant 1.159 1.162 0.970 5.015 4.953 5.087
(3.62)*** (3.57)*** (2.77)*** (7.49)*** (7.49)*** (7.38)***
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,949 15,949 15,197 10,620 10,620 10,252
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.27 0.27 0.28





Ordered Logit Model of Security Choice and Structure 
This table reports coefficient estimates for an ordered logit model. The dependent variable takes the following 
values: 0 (not issuing any type of security), 1 (short-term secured loan), 2 (short-term unsecured loan), 3 
(long-term secured loan), 4 (long-term unsecured loan), 5 (secured bond), 6 (short-term unsecured bond), 7 
(long-term unsecured bond), 8 (convertible bond), and 9 (SEO). The sample period is from 1988 to 2007 in 
Columns (1) and (2) and from the second quarter of 1990 to 2007 in Column (3). Firm-level controls are 
natural logarithm of the total assets, leverage, market to book, cash flow, cash, the inverse of interest coverage, 
a debt-rating dummy, sales growth, and the stock return. Our macro-level control is the term spread. Standard 
errors are corrected for clustering of observations at the firm level. Robust z statistics are in parentheses. The 
symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Age 0.002 0.002 0.002
(3.63)*** (3.76)*** (3.65)***
ln(Total Assets) 0.143 0.144 0.132
(20.31)*** (20.60)*** (20.47)***
Leverage 0.689 0.689 0.700
(11.99)*** (12.00)*** (11.96)***
Market-to-Book 0.037 0.038 0.033
(5.41)*** (5.50)*** (4.88)***
Fixed-Assets Ratio -0.245 -0.251 -0.218
(6.22)*** (6.36)*** (5.43)***
Cash Flow 0.212 0.210 0.227
(3.03)*** (2.98)*** (3.35)***
Cash -0.960 -0.956 -0.950
(7.34)*** (7.27)*** (6.96)***
Inverse Interest Coverage -0.034 -0.034 -0.028
(2.54)** (2.52)** (1.99)**
Debt Rating Dummy 0.892 0.890 0.896
(26.84)*** (26.79)*** (25.67)***
Sales Growth 0.392 0.390 0.388
(25.22)*** (25.01)*** (23.74)***
Stock Return 0.155 0.155 0.149
(23.95)*** (23.97)*** (23.16)***




Low Growth Dummy -0.142
(8.40)***
Weak Credit Dummy -0.097
(6.92)***
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes
Observations 731,652 731,652 661,038
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.05 0.05





Determinants of Debt Quality 
This table reports coefficient estimates for a multinomial logit model. The dependent variable includes five 
different types of bond ratings: not rated, C to Caa1 rated, B3 to Ba1 rated, Baa3 to Baa1 rated, and A3 to Aaa 
rated. The base outcome is not issuing any type of security. Each panel uses different measures of financial 
conditions employed:  Panel A uses the NBER-defined recession dummy, panel B uses the low-GDP-growth 
dummy, and panel C uses the weak-credit dummy. The sample period is from 1971 to 2007. Firm-level 
controls are natural logarithm of the total assets, leverage, market to book, cash flow, cash, the inverse of 
interest coverage, a debt-rating dummy, sales growth, and the stock return. Our macro-level control is the 
term spread, the difference between the yields on ten-year treasuries and one-year treasuries. Standard errors 
are corrected for clustering of observations at the firm level. Robust z  statistics are in parentheses. The 
symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
Panel A
Not Rated C to Caa1 B3 to Ba1 Baa3 to Baa1 A3 to Aaa
Firm Age -0.006 0.001 -0.014 0.015 0.017
(0.92) (0.12) (3.62)*** (3.10)*** (3.00)***
ln(Total Assets) 0.202 0.115 0.136 0.581 0.974
(4.66)*** (1.56) (4.37)*** (12.99)*** (21.05)***
Leverage 1.732 2.517 1.695 0.189 0.023
(6.84)*** (7.08)*** (8.43)*** (0.45) (0.05)
Market-to-Book -0.091 -0.074 -0.272 -0.065 0.093
(1.72)* (0.84) (5.23)*** (0.92) (2.04)**
Fixed-Assets Ratio 0.286 0.223 -0.206 0.733 1.186
(0.85) (0.48) (1.19) (2.01)** (2.56)**
Cash Flow -0.252 -0.092 0.269 1.649 6.108
(1.51) (0.31) (1.04) (2.34)** (6.22)***
Cash 1.532 1.273 -1.183 -6.443 -7.419
(3.46)*** (1.68)* (2.77)*** (6.77)*** (6.94)***
Inverse Interest Coverage -0.078 0.213 -0.036 -0.045 -0.386
(0.69) (1.61) (0.82) (0.46) (4.97)***
Debt Rating Dummy 0.495 1.466 3.002 2.153 1.073
(2.71)*** (4.90)*** (22.90)*** (12.52)*** (5.33)***
Sales Growth 0.450 0.484 0.547 0.621 0.220
(7.88)*** (5.38)*** (13.60)*** (8.46)*** (1.59)
Stock Return 0.137 0.209 0.174 -0.004 0.098
(5.31)*** (9.23)*** (11.03)*** (0.05) (1.45)
Term Spread -5.365 -10.061 10.334 8.564 9.701
(1.29) (1.29) (4.24)*** (2.84)*** (3.90)***
Recession Dummy -0.497 -0.505 0.021 0.181 0.410
(2.29)** (1.29) (0.25) (1.90)* (5.78)***
Constant -9.465 -36.579 -8.052 -11.313 -39.712










Table XI – continued 
 
Panel B
Not Rated C to Caa1 B3 to Ba1 Baa3 to Baa1 A3 to Aaa
Firm Age -0.005 0.001 -0.014 0.014 0.016
(0.84) (0.15) (3.59)*** (3.06)*** (2.88)***
ln(Total Assets) 0.202 0.118 0.140 0.581 0.976
(4.64)*** (1.60) (4.51)*** (13.01)*** (21.12)***
Leverage 1.733 2.521 1.702 0.194 0.045
(6.82)*** (7.04)*** (8.46)*** (0.46) (0.11)
Market-to-Book -0.089 -0.071 -0.272 -0.066 0.095
(1.70)* (0.82) (5.19)*** (0.92) (2.10)**
Fixed-Assets Ratio 0.269 0.208 -0.220 0.734 1.188
(0.80) (0.45) (1.27) (2.01)** (2.57)**
Cash Flow -0.254 -0.081 0.283 1.671 6.175
(1.52) (0.28) (1.09) (2.37)** (6.30)***
Cash 1.546 1.285 -1.189 -6.473 -7.533
(3.49)*** (1.71)* (2.79)*** (6.81)*** (7.03)***
Inverse Interest Coverage -0.078 0.211 -0.036 -0.044 -0.387
(0.70) (1.60) (0.80) (0.45) (4.89)***
Debt Rating Dummy 0.515 1.478 2.986 2.136 1.024
(2.82)*** (4.90)*** (23.09)*** (12.49)*** (5.15)***
Sales Growth 0.447 0.480 0.543 0.617 0.199
(7.89)*** (5.37)*** (13.59)*** (8.36)*** (1.43)
Stock Return 0.140 0.212 0.171 -0.006 0.080
(5.48)*** (9.23)*** (10.64)*** (0.09) (1.16)
Term Spread -7.307 -13.825 8.361 9.149 10.705
(1.68)* (1.73)* (3.31)*** (2.92)*** (3.90)***
Low Growth Dummy -0.328 -0.492 -0.277 0.066 0.133
(2.44)** (2.39)** (5.05)*** (1.11) (2.40)**
Constant -9.428 -37.745 -7.976 -11.308 -39.545











Table XI – continued 
 
Panel C
Not Rated C to Caa1 B3 to Ba1 Baa3 to Baa1 A3 to Aaa
Firm Age -0.002 0.003 -0.013 0.014 0.016
(0.25) (0.31) (3.55)*** (2.96)*** (2.82)***
ln(Total Assets) 0.138 -0.073 0.051 0.523 0.953
(2.26)** (0.72) (1.45) (10.52)*** (16.63)***
Leverage 1.525 2.245 1.619 -0.086 -0.308
(4.77)*** (5.35)*** (7.52)*** (0.17) (0.77)
Market-to-Book -0.020 -0.055 -0.352 -0.088 0.106
(0.43) (0.64) (6.06)*** (1.15) (1.97)**
Fixed-Assets Ratio 0.301 0.212 -0.091 0.672 0.986
(0.63) (0.38) (0.50) (1.78)* (2.06)**
Cash Flow -0.342 -0.363 0.342 1.407 7.458
(2.11)** (1.32) (1.15) (1.98)** (6.64)***
Cash 1.577 1.359 -0.717 -6.419 -8.005
(3.05)*** (1.57) (1.58) (6.52)*** (5.84)***
Inverse Interest Coverage -0.207 0.244 -0.020 -0.012 -0.369
(1.50) (1.29) (0.40) (0.11) (3.72)***
Debt Rating Dummy 0.570 2.539 3.455 2.812 3.071
(1.87)* (5.49)*** (20.20)*** (7.71)*** (9.72)***
Sales Growth 0.348 0.378 0.569 0.613 0.048
(4.60)*** (3.12)*** (12.08)*** (7.21)*** (0.27)
Stock Return 0.111 0.210 0.168 0.022 0.071
(2.50)** (8.78)*** (9.38)*** (0.31) (0.72)
Term Spread -12.005 -22.794 6.188 5.925 12.519
(1.74)* (1.96)** (2.35)** (1.82)* (4.03)***
Weak Credit Dummy -0.610 -0.637 -0.142 -0.012 0.097
(4.23)*** (2.91)*** (2.57)** (0.17) (1.37)
Constant -32.581 -144.163 -7.820 -11.230 -46.190










Figure 1. Proceeds Raised from Different Types of Securities over Time 
This figure presents the log of proceeds raised in real terms (constant 2000 $US millions) by each types of security issues for each calendar month 
from 1971 to 2007.  To smooth out the series, we plot the 11-month moving averages around a specific calendar month.  The shaded areas 
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Figure 2. Proceeds Raised from Public Bonds by Credit Quality over Time 
This figure presents the log of proceeds raised in real terms (constant 2000 $US millions) by public bonds of various quality for each calendar month 
from 1971 to 2007.  To smooth out the series, we plot the 11-month moving averages around a specific calendar month.  The shaded areas 
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